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Hawkins v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 109 (Dec. 28, 2017)1 
 CIVIL: ATTORNEYS FEES AS SANCTIONS 
Summary 
 The Nevada Supreme Court held that the district court must consider the factors from the 
Third Restatement when imposing sanctions in the form of attorney fees on parties.  
Background 
 While at the Meadows Mall, X’Zavion Hawkins, Petitioner, was shot multiple times by 
another patron attending an event. He consulted attorney Paul Shpirt to bring a suit concerning the 
shooting. Shpirt initially agreed to represent him, but later declined. Hawkins then retained a 
different attorney at another firm. Shpirt changed firms and began working at Lewis Brisbois 
Bisgaard & Smith (LBBS), a firm retained by Meadows Mall, the defendant in Hawkins’ case. 
LBBS screened Shpirt when they learned about the conflict; however, LBBS did not notify 
Hawkins of the conflict. Equally important, during discovery, Hawkins was omitting or providing 
false information as well as changing his version of the events, so Meadows sought discovery 
sanctions and moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court granted the discovery sanctions, 
but denied the motion to dismiss.  
 The district court disqualified LBBS for not notifying Hawkins of the conflict and for 
failing to obtain his informed consent.2 Subsequently, Meadows Mall sought attorney fees to 
effectuate the order imposing discovery sanctions against Hawkins, and of those fees, $29,201 was 
to go to LBBS. Despite Hawkins arguing that LBBS was not entitled to attorney fees because they 
were disqualified, the district court granted the attorney fees and ordered Hawkins to pay $41,635 
to Meadows Mall, which included $19,846 for work done by LBBS. The district court stated that 
it was within their discretion to award attorney fees as sanctions. 
Discussion 
The Court considered whether the district court “abused its discretion in failing to consider 
LBBS’s disqualified status in awarding sanctions in the nature of attorney fees.”3 Under NRCP 
37, the district court may impose discovery sanctions, including reasonable expenses and 
attorney’s fees.4 However, the district court must also consider the factors outlined in the 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 37 cmt. a (2000), which the district court 
expressly rejected. The factors to consider when determining a fee forfeiture include the (1) “‘the 
extent of the misconduct,’ (2) ‘whether the breach involved knowing violation or conscious 
disloyalty to a client,’ (3) whether forfeiture is ‘proportionate to the seriousness of the offense,’ 
and (4) ‘the adequacy of other remedies.’”  The court must consider these factors must be and 
weigh them against each other when determining attorney fees as sanctions, and LBBS’s 
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2  Pursuant to RPC 1.9 and RPC 1.10(e). 
3  Hawkins, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. at 4. 
4  NRCP 37(c)(2). 
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disqualified status falls under these factors. Here, the district court rejected the Restatement’s 
authority and did not consider these factors when determining the discovery sanctions.  
Conclusion 
 Vacated and remanded. The Court held that a district court must analyze and apply the 
factors from the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 37 cmt. d (2000) when 
determining the reasonableness of an attorney fees award as a sanction.  
 
	
